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Learning takes time, namely, one needs to be exposed to contingency relations between
stimulus dimensions in order to learn, whereas intentional control can be recruited through
task demands.Therefore showing that control can be recruited as a function of experimental
instructions alone, that is, adapting the processing according to the instructions before the
exposure to the task, can be taken as evidence for existence of control recruitment in the
absence of learning. This was done by manipulating the information given at the outset of
the experiment. In the ﬁrst experiment, we manipulated list-level congruency proportion.
Half of the participantswere informed thatmost of the stimuliwould be congruent, whereas
the other halfwere informed thatmost of the stimuliwould be incongruent.This held true for
the stimuli in the second part of each experiment. In the ﬁrst part, however, the proportion
of the two stimulus types was equal. A proportion congruent (PC) effect was found in both
parts of the experiment, but it was larger in the second part. In our second experiment, we
manipulated the proportion of the stimuli within participants by applying an item-speciﬁc
design.This was done by presenting some color words most often in their congruent color,
and other color words in incongruent colors. Participants were informed about the exact
word-color pairings in advance. Similar to Experiment 1, this held true only for the second
experimental part. In contrast to our ﬁrst experiment, informing participants in advance
did not result in an item-speciﬁc proportion effect, which was observed only in the second
part. Thus our results support the hypothesis that instructions may be enough to trigger
list-level control, yet learning does contribute to the PC effect under such conditions. The
item-level proportion effect is apparently caused by learning or at least it is moderated
by it.
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INTRODUCTION
The Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991) has been
extensively used to investigate control of attention. In this
paradigm, participants are asked to name the color of the ink of a
color word and ignore the meaning of the stimulus word. Usually,
participants respond slower when the word and the ink color are
incongruent (e.g., GREEN written in red) compared to when the
word is congruent with the ink color (e.g., RED written in red).
This effect is known as the Stroop effect and it demonstrates effects
of prepotentword reading processes on color namingperformance
(Cohen et al., 1990; MacLeod, 1991; Tzelgov et al., 1992).
The proportion congruent (PC) effect—an increase of the Stroop
effect when the proportion of congruent stimuli increases—is fre-
quently taken as a marker of conﬂict adaptation in the Stroop
task (i.e., participants are able to adapt to conﬂict encountered in
the task by adjusting attention away from the source of conﬂict;
Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, 1980; Lowe andMitterer, 1982;
Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Lindsay and Jacoby, 1994).
Botvinick et al. (2001) modeled the control of the Stroop
effect by extending Cohen et al.’s (1990) work, thereby provid-
ing a possible explanation for the PC effect1. According to the
1It should be clear that in the absence of neutral stimuli (as in the designs
of Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, 1980; Lowe and Mitterer, 1982;
conﬂict monitoring model of Botvinick et al. (2001), control
is triggered by a module responsible for detecting conﬂicts in
information processing; namely, the conﬂict monitoring unit
(assumed to be located at the ACC). This unit calculates the
amount of conﬂict at the response layer and accordingly increases
the input from the relevant task demand (color naming) units
when the level of conﬂict is high. This mechanism measures
the level of conﬂict on each trial and then the cognitive system
uses this conﬂict information to adjust attention (i.e., conﬂict
adaptation).
In the Stroop task, incongruent items generate more conﬂict
than congruent items. Namely, higher proportions of incongru-
ent items give rise to higher levels of conﬂict, which in turn
result in increased cognitive control via the activation of the rele-
vant task demands (color naming), leading to a decreased Stroop
effect.
Lindsay and Jacoby, 1994) the PC effect means that the proportion of incongru-
ent stimuli out of the total number of stimuli in a given block decreases as the
proportion of congruent stimuli increases. Botvinick et al. (2001) modeled the con-
trol of the Stroop effect by simulating the results of Tzelgov et al. (1992). Note that
these researchers employed neutrals in their design and their manipulation was
based on changing the proportion of color word vs. neutrals while holding the ratio
of congruent to incongruent stimuli constant. This implies that in this case conﬂict
adaptation was led by the proportion of the conﬂicting (incongruent) stimuli out
of the total number of stimuli in each experimental block.
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However, recent ﬁndings have challenged this widely accepted
model and the conﬂict adaptation theory overall. This challenge
startedwith the ﬁnding that the PC effect can be item-speciﬁc. The
item-speciﬁc proportion congruent (ISPC) effect—larger congru-
ency effect for color words presented mostly congruently than for
those presentedmostly incongruently (Jacoby et al., 2003; Schmidt
et al., 2007)—pointed to possible involvement of learning pro-
cesses in the proportion effect. Jacoby et al. (2003) introduced the
ISPC task by manipulating PC between items instead of between
participants or between blocks. That is, some words (e.g., BLUE
and RED) were presented most often in their congruent color
(high PC), while others (e.g., GREEN and YELLOW) were pre-
sented most often in an incongruent color (low PC). A larger
congruency effect was observed for high, relative to low, PC items.
The conﬂict adaptation account suggests that PC effects are due
to modulation of attention to the word as a reaction to the gen-
eral conﬂict level in the task as a whole, but given that high and
low PC trials are intermixed in the item-speciﬁc task, one cannot
know in advance whether one needs to attend or not attend to the
word. Therefore, it cannot explain item-speciﬁc effects. Learning
accounts conversely propose that the cognitive system learns how
to respond to a speciﬁc condition, thus explaining item-speciﬁc
proportion effects. Therefore, conﬂict adaptation does not have to
be assumed.
Given this problem, Blais et al. (2007; see also Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008, 2009; Blais and Verguts, 2012) proposed that
learning processes may contribute to conﬂict adaptation. In
particular, Blais et al. (2007) modiﬁed Botvinick et al.’s (2001)
model by allowing the modulation to be condition-speciﬁc, that
is, by modulating the connections between a speciﬁc condition
[e.g., the stimulus color (Bugg et al., 2008) or location2 (Crump
et al., 2006)] and the required response according to their co-
occurrence. Such a model allows for simulating ISPC effects.
Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009) noted that the conﬂict mon-
itoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001) and the Blais et al. (2007)
version of it clearly specify when extra control should be exerted,
but not where. In particular, response conﬂict warns the cog-
nitive system that it should be attentive, thus specifying when
it should be activated. The conﬂict monitoring model further
postulates that this is done by increasing activation of the cur-
rently relevant task representation (task demand unit). However,
how the control system knows which stimuli are more con-
ﬂicting than others [e.g., how the systems knows that red and
blue are mostly congruent (MC), while yellow and green are
mostly incongruent (MI), i.e., where to intervene] is left unspec-
iﬁed. As a solution to this problem, Verguts and Notebaert
(2009) proposed a model in which Hebbian learning provides
the mechanism for binding speciﬁc stimulus–response combina-
tions, suggesting that the modulation of cognitive control might
be the result of interactions between arousal and online learning
processes.
While ﬂexible conﬂict adaptation models (Blais et al., 2007;
Verguts and Notebaert, 2009) as presented above can provide an
explanation for ISPC effects by showing that control adaptation
2Blais et al. (2007) did not simulate the context-speciﬁc proportion congruent
(CSPC) effect, but we believe this could probably be done in their model.
can be applied under speciﬁc conditions, such effects can be
also explained by a pure stimulus–response (S–R) contingency-
learning mechanism (Schmidt et al., 2007, 2010; Schmidt and
Besner, 2008; see also Mordkoff, 1996). According to the
contingency-learning account, participants learn the associations
between certain words and certain responses and thus frequently
appearing conditions are responded to much quicker. In tests of
this account, as in an ISPC experiment, one set of words is pre-
sented mostly in their congruent color (e.g., GREEN written in
green), and another set is presented mostly in their incongruent
color (e.g., BLUE written in yellow), and thus participants are able
to associate certain words with certain responses (e.g., the word
green with the response green, the word blue with the response
yellow).
Schmidt and Besner (2008) claimed that the standard PC
experiments confound item-speciﬁc and list-level3 PC effects.
Because all stimuli are presented most often in their congruent
color in the MC condition, and most often in their incongruent
color in the MI condition, these contingency biases are capa-
ble of producing a PC effect on their own. Bugg and Chanani
(2011; see also Bugg et al., 2011), however, proposed that both
contingency learning and conﬂict adaptation may contribute to
the proportion effect in the Stroop task. They demonstrated that
list-wide proportion effects cannot be fully explained by item-
speciﬁc mechanisms (cf. Hutchison, 2011). Bugg and Chanani
suggested that participants may not implement list-wide control
when associative learning provides a reliable and efﬁcient means
for responding (e.g., Bugg et al., 2008; Blais and Bunge, 2010). In
their word-picture Stroop experiment, they increased the set of
possible responses on incongruent trials, that is, they generated
more contingent response options, which made associative learn-
ing less effective. The researchers found a list-level proportion
congruency effect for 50% congruent items, showing that list-level
proportion congruency effects could be observed independently
of ISPC effects. Bugg (2014) demonstrated similar results in a
color-word Stroop task. In her study, participants showed no evi-
dence of increased control in high relative to low conﬂict context
when they were able to rely on item-speciﬁc S–R associations to
respond to the majority of trials (Experiments 1B and 2A). By
contrast, when this was not a reliable approach, due to there being
multiple possible responses on incongruent trials (i.e., a four-item
biased set), increased use of control was observed in the high rel-
ative to the low conﬂict context (PC effect in Experiments 1A
and 2B).
Recently, Schmidt (2013a) proposed a temporal learning-based
explanation of list-wide PC effects. According to his proposal, par-
ticipants may learn when to respond in speciﬁc conditions rather
than what to respond (i.e., contingency learning). Such temporal
learning results in biasing response retrieval times in speciﬁc con-
ditions. Namely, in the high PC conditions, congruent trials are
responded to faster, so the high frequency of quick responses leads
participants into a rapid pace of responding to congruent trials,
with a penalty to the infrequent incongruent trials. In contrast, in
3The term list-level PC (in contrast to item-speciﬁc PC) refers to a situation inwhich
the congruent to incongruent ratio is held constant for all color words included in
a given block.
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the low PC conditions, most previous responses are slow, leading
to a slower expectancy. Incongruent trials beneﬁt from the slower
expectancy, thus leading to a smaller Stroop effect.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The associative learning accounts that propose learning-based
modulation of conﬂict adaptation (i.e., Blais et al., 2007; Verguts
and Notebaert, 2008, 2009; Blais and Verguts, 2012), as well as
those proposing that (contingency) learning alone can account for
the PC and the ISPC effects (Schmidt et al., 2007, 2010; Schmidt
and Besner, 2008; Schmidt, 2013b), suggest that gaining experi-
ence with the stimuli (S–R) relations is crucial in order to learn.
As described earlier, the ISPC effect was examined in order to
reveal the contribution of learning. We examined if gaining expe-
rience is a necessary condition for the PC effect. The conﬂict
monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001), as well as the com-
putational model of Blais et al. (2007), does not specify where
extra control has to be exerted. It does suggest, however, that
once the system knows there is a conﬂict, it recruits control.
This allows us to assume that “knowing” may be enough and the
actual exposure to the task (i.e., experiencing the S–R relations)
is not always necessary to generate control. Therefore, showing
that PC effects can be observed as a function of experimental
instructions alone, when participants receive no practice, is evi-
dence of the existence for control recruitment in the absence of
learning.
The idea that instructions alone are not enough in order to
learn is supported by Schmidt and De Houwer’s (2012) ﬁndings.
These researchers aimed to reveal whether contingency awareness
resulting from instructions can aid performance in an implicit
learning task, such as the color-word contingency learning task. In
their second experiment, three color-unrelated words were pre-
sented most often in a particular color (e.g., “plate” most often
in green, “month” most often in red, and “under” in yellow). In
addition, they manipulated the experimental instructions. Half
of the participants were told the word-color contingencies in
advance and half were not. The researchers showed that when the
contingency instructions were given, but no contingencies were
actually present, no contingency effect was found. By contrast,
Meiran et al. (2012) proposed recently that application of novel
plans that have never been executed before is not only possible but
may actually represent the typical scenario of control adaptation.
Similarly, Verbruggen et al. (2014) proposed that participants are
able to derive action rules from instructions and immediately per-
form a task that they have never done before as a prepared or
intention- based reﬂex.
Based on these ﬁndings, the aim of the present study was to dis-
tinguish between the effects of control recruitment by instructions
(henceforth control by instructions) and those of learning.
EXPERIMENT 1
We aimed to differentiate between control by instructions and
learning by manipulating the information given at the outset of
the experiment. Half of the participants were informed that most
of the stimuli would be congruent, whereas the other half were
informed that most of the stimuli would be incongruent. This
held true for the stimuli in the second part of the experiment,
however, in the ﬁrst part the proportion of the two stimulus types
was equal; therefore it was impossible to learn the proportions
during the ﬁrst part. If control by instructions does exist, wewould
expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant PC effect from the very beginning of
the experiment. If the PC effect also reﬂects learning, the effect
should be larger in the second part of the experiment. Finally, if
PC is caused exclusively by learning, it should appear only in the
second half of the experiment.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-eight students at Ben-GurionUniversity of theNegev,who
were native speakers of Hebrew, participated in the experiment. All
had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight. Participation in the
experiment was in partial fulﬁllment of course requirements. All
participants gave written informed consent. The experiment was
approved by the ethics committee of the Psychology Department
at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
Stimuli
Weused four colors in the experiment: red, green, blue, and yellow.
The name of each of these colors inHebrew consists of four letters.
We generated the congruent stimuli by printing each of the four
color names in its own color.We generated the incongruent stimuli
by printing each color name in ink colors of the three other colors.
The stimuli were presented on a 17′′ widescreenCRTmonitor with
a resolution 1024× 768, in bold-faced 18-point Courier New font.
Data collection and stimuli presentation were controlled by E-
Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA)
on a Dell computer with an Intel Pentium 4 central processor. The
two types of stimuli (congruent or incongruent) were randomly
ordered.
Design and procedure
We created two experimental conditions. Half of the participants
were informed that most of the stimuli would be congruent,
whereas the other half were told that most of the stimuli would
be incongruent. This held true for the stimuli in the second part
of the experiment [congruent to incongruent ratio (C/I) = 80/20
or 20/80 in accordance with the instructions given] but in the ﬁrst
part the proportion of the two stimulus types was equal; there-
fore it was impossible to learn the proportions during the ﬁrst
part (C/I ratio = 50/50). Fourteen participants were randomly
assigned to each of the experimental conditions. Participants were
tested individually. At the beginning of the experiment, the task
was explained to the participants, who were asked to ignore the
written word and name the ink color as fast as possible with-
out making errors. Depending on the experimental group they
were allocated to, participants were informed what the distribu-
tion of the stimuli to be presented would be: (English translation)
In this experiment, you will see congruent (the word and the
ink color are congruent, e.g., RED printed in red) and incongru-
ent (the word and the ink color are incongruent) stimuli. Note
that most of the stimuli will appear as congruent (/incongruent)
stimuli.
There were no practice trials and no breaks between the two
experimental parts. Each experimental part consisted of 120 trials.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1108 | 3
Entel et al. Instructions may be enough




























The participants sat opposite to the display screen. The stimuli
were presented in the center of the screen, at ∼80 cm from the
participant’s eyes. Each trial began with a ﬁxation point presented
for 500 ms (a white plus sign at the center of a black screen). After
that, the stimulus appeared and remained in view until the par-
ticipant’s response into a microphone, which stopped the timer
and removed the stimulus from the screen. Reaction time (RT)
in milliseconds was measured by the computer from the stimulus
onset until the participant’s response. A keypress by the experi-
menter initiated the next trial. Responses were scored as errors if
the initial consonant sound indicated a color other than that of
the current trial. The experimenter typed in the vocal response of
the participant on one of four keys so that the computer could
evaluate errors.
The instructions given to participants (“most of the stimuli
would be congruent/ incongruent”) were manipulated between
participants. Stimulus type (congruent or incongruent) and the
part of the experiment (ﬁrst or second) were manipulated within
participants (see Table 1 for details). RT was the main dependent
variable in the experiment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For each participant, mean RTs of correct responses and of the
percentage of errors (PEs) in each experimental condition were
calculated. RTs of error trials were omitted (less than 2% of all
responses) as were RTs slower than 2,500 ms and faster than
250 ms. All effects were tested at a signiﬁcance level (α) of 0.05.
A three-wayANOVA (analysis of variance)mixed-factormodel
with stimulus type and part of the experiment as within-
participant factors, and type of instructions as a between-
participant factor, revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for stimulus
type, F(1,26) = 104.2, MSE = 3,107, η2p = 0.8. The two-way
interaction between stimulus type and instructions was signif-
icant, F(1,26) = 24.65, MSE = 3,107, η2p = 0.49, as was the
three-way interaction between the stimulus type, part and the
instructions, F(1,26) = 12.36, MSE = 1,250, η2p = 0.32 (see
Figure 1).
Further analysis revealed signiﬁcant simple interactions
between instructions and stimulus type, both in part 1 where
the proportions of the color words were equal, F(1,26) = 11.16,
MSE = 1,039.87, η2p = 0.3, and in part 2 where we changed the
proportions in accordance with the instructions, F(1,26) = 24.24,
MSE = 3,317.04, η2p = 0.48, revealing smaller Stroop effects in
the C/I = 20/80 conditions (142 ms for MC vs. 84 ms for MI
in part 1, and 178 ms for MC vs. 26 ms for MI conditions in
part 2).
In the current design, the part of the experiment and the pro-
portions that the participants were exposed to were confounded;
the ﬁrst and second experimental parts differed not only in pro-
portions but also in length of exposure to experimental stimuli
and in the amount of fatigue experienced by the participant.
To test the hypothesis that the time location in the experiment
per se inﬂuenced behavior, were analyzed the ﬁrst part of the
experiment after adding location within the ﬁrst part (i.e., ﬁrst
vs. second half) to the design. Splitting the ﬁrst part did not
moderate the effects of congruency, instructions or their inter-
actions (F < 1). This ﬁnding supports the claim that the increase
in the PC effect (by 94 ms) in the second part of the experi-
ment is due to learning. As one can see in Figure 1, responses
for congruent stimuli were 46 ms faster when most of the stim-
uli were congruent, F(1,26) = 13.3, MSE = 922.34, η2p = 0.34,
and incongruent stimuli were 106 ms faster when most of the
stimuli appeared as incongruent, F(1,26) = 6.47, MSE = 12,102,
η2p = 0.20.
The error rate was very low, averaging 1.24%. A three-way
repeated measures ANOVA with stimulus type and part as
within-participant factors, and type of instructions as a
FIGURE 1 | Proportion congruent effect as a function of instruction type and experimental part in Experiment 1. Error bars are one standard error of the
mean. MC, mostly congruent; MI, mostly incongruent.
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between-participant factor, revealed a single signiﬁcantmain effect
for stimulus type, F(1,26)= 8.45,MSE= 2.97,η2p = 0.24, showing
more errors for the incongruent stimuli.
These results, as those proposed by Bugg (2014; see also Bugg
andChanani,2011), suggest that both learning and control adapta-
tion via mere instructions may contribute to the proportion effect
in the Stroop task. Namely, our results show that in addition to
stimulus–response associative learning, control contributes to the
proportion effect.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that pro-active control can be acti-
vated by instructions in the absence of learning. In the ﬁrst
experiment we manipulated the list-level proportions (i.e., most
of the stimuli appeared as congruent or incongruent trials),
but we did not change the item-speciﬁc proportions. There-
fore, the purpose of our second experiment was to discover
whether the ISPC effect could be observed as a function of
experimental instructions alone, thus indicating item-level control
recruitment.
We manipulated the item-speciﬁc proportions, generating two
color sets–color words presented mostly in their congruent color,
and color words presented mostly in their incongruent color. Par-
ticipants were informed about the exact word-color contingencies
in advance. Similar to Experiment 1, this held true only for the sec-
ond part of the experiment, while in the ﬁrst experimental part the
item-speciﬁc proportion was equal. Therefore it was impossible to
learn the proportions during the ﬁrst part. The list proportion
congruency was held constant. If item-level control by instruc-
tions does exist, we would expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ISPC effect
from the very beginning of the experiment. If the ISPC effect
also reﬂects learning, the effect should be larger in the second
part of the experiment. Finally, if the ISPC effect is caused exclu-




Thirty-four students at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, who
were native speakers of Hebrew, participated in the experiment.
All had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and had not par-
ticipated in Experiment 1. Participation in the experiment was in
partial fulﬁllment of course requirements. All participants gave
written informed consent. The experiment was approved by the
ethics committee of the Psychology Department at Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev.
Stimuli and procedure
We used two sets of color words (i.e., red and blue vs. yellow and
green). In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, each color word was
presented 30 times and the item-speciﬁc proportion was equal for
the two sets (e.g., red and blue were presented half of the time
in their congruent color (i.e., in 15 trials each) and the other
half in their incongruent color). In the second part, we varied
the item-speciﬁc proportions: for the ﬁrst set, each color word
was presented in its congruent color in 24 trials (80%) and in
the other color from that set in 6 trials (20%) to produce the
MC condition. For the second set, these rates were reversed to
produce the MI condition (i.e., each color word was presented as
an incongruent stimulus in 24 trials and as a congruent stimu-
lus in 6 trials). Thus, overall, in the experiment there were 120
congruent trials and 120 incongruent trials (60 congruent and 60
incongruent stimuli in each block), with each color and color-
word appearing equally often, while the item-speciﬁc proportion
was changed only in the second experimental part. Assignment
of color sets to the MC and MI conditions was counterbalanced
across participants.
At the beginning of the experiment, the task was explained
to the participants, who were asked to ignore the written word
and name the ink color as fast as possible without making errors.
In addition, participants were informed what the distribution
of the stimuli to be presented would be. As in Experiment 1,
they received instructions telling them of the word-color con-
tingencies involved in the task. One group was instructed that
red and blue would appear mostly as congruent stimuli, while
yellow and green would appear mostly as incongruent stim-
uli: (English translation) In this experiment, you will see color
words printed in colors. Note that RED and BLUE will appear
mostly as congruent stimuli (the word and the ink color are
congruent), while YELLOW and GREEN will appear mostly as
incongruent (the word and the ink color are incongruent) stim-
uli. The other group was instructed exactly the opposite, that is,
that yellow and green would appear mostly as congruent stimuli
while red and blue would appear mostly as incongruent stim-
uli. There were no practice trials and no break between the
two experimental parts. Each experimental part consisted of 120
trials.
Three independent variables—condition (MCorMI), stimulus
type (congruent or incongruent), and experimental part (1 or 2)—
were manipulated between participants (see Table 1 for details).
RT was the main dependent variable in the experiment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For each participant, mean RTs of correct responses and of the PE
in each experimental condition were calculated. RTs of error trials
were omitted (less than 1% of all responses) as were RTs slower
than 2,500 ms and faster than 250 ms. All effects were tested at a
signiﬁcance level (α) of 0.05.
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA with condition, stim-
ulus type, and part as within-participant factors revealed a signiﬁ-
cant main effect for stimulus type, F(1,33) = 151.2, MSE = 4,707,
η2p = 0.82. The two-way interaction between condition and stimu-
lus type was signiﬁcant, F(1,33) = 29.53,MSE = 1,516, η2p = 0.47,
as was the three-way interaction between the condition, stimu-
lus type and part, F(1,33) = 28.9, MSE = 1,412, η2p = 0.47 (see
Figure 2).
The ﬁrst part of the experiment revealed no difference
between the congruency effects in the two proportion condi-
tions, F < 1. This ﬁnding implies that informing the partici-
pants about the word-color contingencies without giving them
the opportunity to learn the S–R relations was not enough
to produce the ISPC effect. In order to reassure this additive
pattern, we also computed the Bayesian posterior probabili-
ties (see Wagenmakers, 2007; Campbell and Thompson, 2012).
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FIGURE 2 | Item-specific proportion congruent effect as a function of instruction type and experimental part in Experiment 2. Error bars are one
standard error of the mean. MC, mostly congruent; MI, mostly incongruent.
We estimated the posterior probabilities of p (H0 | D; i.e., the
posterior probability of null effect of instructions) and of p (H1 |
D; i.e., the posterior probability that instructions were enough
to modulate control) as 0.85 and 0.15 for H0 and H1 respec-
tively, leading to dBIC of 3.5, which according to Campbell
and Thompson (2012), is substantial evidence for H0. Thus,
it is apparently not enough to provide information that pro-
cessing the meaning of stimuli in speciﬁc colors is harmful to
performance.
In contrast to the ﬁrst part of the experiment, we observed a sig-
niﬁcant simple interaction between condition and stimulus type
in the second part, where we changed the speciﬁc item propor-
tions in accordance with the instructions, revealing a signiﬁcant
ISPC effect, F(1,33) = 38.14, MSE = 2,242.52, η2p = 0.54. Further
analysis revealed faster responses (by 41 ms( for the congruent
stimuli in the MC condition, F(1,33) = 9.04, MSE = 3,178.98,
η2p = 0.22, and faster responses (by 59 ms) for the incongruent
stimuli in the MI condition, F(1,33) = 36.04, MSE = 1,653.08,
η2p = 0.52.
The error rate was very low, averaging 1%. A three-way
repeated measures ANOVA with item type, stimulus type, and
part as within-participant factors revealed faster responses for
congruent stimuli, F(1,33) = 33.65, MSE = 4.24, η2p = 0.5.
The two-way interaction between item type and stimulus type
was signiﬁcant, F(1,33) = 6.4, MSE = 3.96, η2p = 0.16, reveal-
ing more errors for incongruent stimuli in the MC condition
rather than in the MI condition, F(1,33) = 33.65, MSE = 4.73,
η2p = 0.13. Less errors were also observed for congruent tri-
als in the MC condition than in the MI condition, however,
the difference was not signiﬁcant, F(1,33) = 1.64, MSE = 2.6,
η2p = 0.05.
Observing a signiﬁcant ISPC effect when item-speciﬁc pro-
portions are varied, resulting in color-word contingency, implies
that this effect reﬂects associative learning. Therefore our results
support the notion that learning processes are important (e.g.,
Schmidt and Besner, 2008; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009),
showing that in contrast to the PC effect, the ISPC effect is
not observed in the absence of learning, that is, experiencing
S–R contingencies is crucial in order to be able to adapt
performance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our ﬁrst experiment, we informed half of the participants
that most of the stimuli would be congruent, whereas the other
half were told that most of the stimuli would be incongruent.
This held true for the stimuli in the second part of the exper-
iment, but in the ﬁrst part the proportion of the two stimulus
types was equal. A signiﬁcant PC effect was found in both parts
of the experiment, but it was larger in the second experimental
part. In our second experiment, we manipulated the item-speciﬁc
proportions,while the list-level proportionwas held constant. Par-
ticipants were told word-color contingencies in advance but the
information, similar to in Experiment 1, was valid only for the
second experimental part. In contrast to the list-wide PC effect in
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the ISPC effect was found only in
the second experimental part, where we varied the item-speciﬁc
proportions.
Our results showed that instructions may be enough to trig-
ger list-level control, thus supporting Cohen-Kdoshay andMeiran
(2009) who showed that instructions can be implemented with
a high degree of accuracy even on the very ﬁrst trial. This
raises an important question: How do instructions inﬂuence
behavior? Recently, Ramamoorthy and Verguts (2012; see also
Doll et al., 2009) suggested a possible computational model of
applying instructions. In their model they distinguish between
instructions leading to rule-based “learning” and actual expo-
sure to the task stimuli. According to the model, instructions
are acquired [apparently by the prefrontal cortex (PFC)] before
the actual exposure to the task. Upon repeated application, the
basal ganglia (which learn more slowly but execute more quickly)
pick up the appropriate stimulus–response mapping by Hebbian
learning.
It is important to note that in contrast to our ﬁrst experiment,
in Experiment 2 the ISPC effect was found only in the second
experimental part, showing that this effect cannot be produced
solely by prior information about the word-color contingencies.
We assume that a possible reason for this difference can lay in
the difﬁculty of the instructions. Learning all the item-speciﬁc
pairings in the ISPC task is much harder than learning “most
of the stimuli will be presented in their congruent/incongruent
color,” therefore, in our ﬁrst experiment adapting performance via
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instructions was much easier than in our second experiment and
also in Schmidt andDeHouwer’s (2012) study. This explanation is
line with Meiran et al.’s (2012) claim that automatic applications
of novel (never executed before) plans are possible only if the task
instructions are not too complicated.
To conclude, our results shed new light on the relations between
control and associative learning, showing that both processes can
take part in themodiﬁcation of the Stroop phenomenon.We show
that under speciﬁc (relatively simple) conditions, practice is not
necessary for the emergence of the PC effect, from which it fol-
lows that control adaptation may lead to such effects. While the
conﬂict monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001) and all its later
versions (e.g., Blais et al., 2007) do not show how conﬂict adapta-
tion can be activated by instructions alone, such models could be
easily extended to include adaptation on the basis of instructions
as shown by Cole et al. (2010) and Ramamoorthy and Verguts
(2012). Furthermore, it could also be argued that the increase
in the PC effect in the second part of Experiment 1 can also be
explained by conﬂict adaptation, assuming that changes in the
color-word contingencies change the actual experienced level of
conﬂict, thereby increasing the PC effect. This, however, cannot
explain the results of Experiment 2 without assuming a learning
mechanism that directs attention to high conﬂict conditions (e.g.,
Hebbian learning as suggested by Verguts and Notebaert, 2008).
Thus, it seems that several mechanisms are involved in the PC
effect.
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